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 The Nonmetro Vote and the 
Election of Donald Trump 
 
 
Don E. Albrecht 
Western Rural Development Center 
Utah State University 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Securing an overwhelming majority of the rural vote was vital to Donald 
Trump’s surprise win in the 2016 presidential election. This article 
provides an analysis of the relationship between rural/urban residence and 
2016 voting patterns. The Trump campaign’s unique emphasis on 
economic and racial issues attracted large numbers of voters from groups 
threatened by rapid cultural, economic, and demographic change 
occurring in the US. Prominent among threatened groups is the rural, 
white working class. The analysis reveals that rural counties where a large 
percentage of the residents were white, with low levels of education and 
working in the goods-producing industries, cast a proportionally large 
share of their votes for Trump. The analysis also makes it apparent that it 
is not rural residence, per se, but other characteristics (white, poorly 
educated, and working in the goods-producing industries) that resulted in 
the strong Trump vote.  
 
 
KEYWORDS 
2016 election; Donald Trump; rural vote 
  
1
Albrecht: The Nonmetro Vote and the Election of Donald Trump
Published by eGrove, 2019
 INTRODUCTION 
Republicans have dominated nonmetropolitan (nonmetro) America in 
national, state, and local elections for years. This is especially true in 
areas such as Appalachia, the rural South, Great Plains, and Mountain 
West (Goetz et al. 2018; McKee and Teigen 2009; Monnat and Brown 
2017; Scala and Johnson 2017). In the 2016 presidential election, the 
proportion of nonmetro voters choosing Donald Trump was even greater 
than the proportion voting for the Republican candidate in the past, and 
this domination was critical to his victory. The extent of Trump domination 
in some nonmetro counties was astounding. For example, in Harding 
County, South Dakota, Trump received 695 votes to 38 for Clinton; in 
Banner County, Nebraska, Trump was victorious 357 to 19; and in 
Campbell County, Wyoming, Trump received 15,778 votes to Clinton’s 
1,324 The nonmetro vote was especially significant in the vital swing 
states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. 
This article provides an empirical examination of the significance of 
the rural vote in the 2016 presidential election, examining voting patterns 
in counties arrayed along the rural/urban continuum. Other county 
characteristics such as race and industry of employment are also 
empirically considered. The perspective used in this manuscript is that 
when change threatens the social standing of individuals, threatened 
individuals strongly resist that change. Beginning with the work of Polanyi 
(1944), scholars have recognized that since the emergence of 
industrialization and market society, changes in the way the people make 
a living (economic structure) often have negative implications for entire 
categories of people, and impacted people resist these problematic 
changes (Hadjimichalis and Hudson 2014; McMichael 1997). From this 
perspective, recent economic structure changes have had significant 
negative implications for the white working class. A number of studies in 
the US have found that white opposition to minorities tends to increase 
when whites consider threats from minorities to be greatest. Perceived 
threats increase when minority numbers are increasing rapidly, when 
minority power appears to grow or when their relative position in the 
workforce improves (e.g. Blumer 1958; Bobo 1999; Gilens 1999; Wetts 
and Willer 2018).  
Much of the research on reactions of threatened groups to change 
has focused on race. The perspective, however, can easily be expanded 
to account for any group threatened by any source of change. In recent 
years the economic standing of the white working class has declined 
considerably because of economic structure changes similar to those 
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 described by Polanyi. Further, many white working class individuals see 
growing minority populations threatening their position at what they 
consider to be the top of the social hierarchy. Many felt that the election of 
Barack Obama as president indicated growing minority power (Hochschild 
2016; Wetts and Willer 2018), and Donald Trump’s campaign message 
consisted of direct and veiled messages that appealed to these threatened 
groups. Trump promised to “Make America Great Again” by limiting 
immigration of non-whites and restoring working class jobs through 
restructured trade deals, reduced environmental regulation, and the 
implementation of tariffs. Not only did this stance help him win large 
shares of the rural and working class vote, but it is also expected that he 
received a larger proportion of this vote than Mitt Romney four years 
earlier who did not emphasize this same message.  
In this article hypotheses are developed and tested to measure the 
extent to which rural counties with large proportions of white, working 
class residents were likely to vote for Trump in 2016 compared to Romney 
in 2012. To test these expectations, analysis of the 2012 and 2016 
elections is provided, including a more detailed look at Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin because of their significance in the 2016 
election. 
 
REPUBLICAN DOMINATION OF NONMETRO AMERICA 
The Republican Party has not always dominated rural America. Rural 
voters were supportive of Democrat President Franklin Roosevelt’s “New 
Deal” and Democrat President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society.” As 
recently as 1976, rural voters were more likely to vote Democrat than their 
urban counterparts, and in both 1992 and 1996 the Republican candidate 
did not receive a majority of rural votes (see Figure 1). In each election 
since 1980, however, a higher proportion of rural compared to urban 
residents voted Republican, and the gap has tended to steadily increase 
(Bartels 1998; Black, Black, and Black 2009; Morrill, Knopp, and Brown 
2007). In 2000, 57.8 percent of rural residents voted for the Republican 
candidate compared to 48.1 percent of urban residents – a difference of 
9.7. By the 2012 election, the rural/urban gap had increased to 13.15. 
Then in 2016, Trump received 66.6 percent of the rural vote while 
obtaining 45.8 percent of the urban vote – an incredibly large gap of 20.8 
percent. Increasingly, it appears that voting behavior is based on identity 
politics, where votes are less a factor of social class and more a function 
of place and group identity (Fraser 1998). Several factors may be relevant, 
including cultural, economic, and demographic change. 
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CULTURAL CHANGE 
Writing more than three-quarters of a century ago, Wirth (1938) noted 
fundamental differences between urban and rural areas. The most 
obvious difference is that urban areas have more people and a greater 
population density. Largely as a consequence of size and density 
differences, urban areas also experience greater social heterogeneity. 
Rural interaction patterns therefore differ from those in urban areas, and 
rural residents tend to interact with fewer individuals who are different from 
them. The result tends to be more social conservatism in rural areas and 
less experience with and support for the diversity and multiculturalism that 
presently exist in urban America (Hochschild 2016).  
In recent decades, rapid social and cultural changes have created 
significant discomfort among many rural Americans about the direction the 
US is going. Many rural people are uncomfortable with the Democrat 
vision of a diverse and multicultural America and desire the more 
homogenous communities of the past (Hochschild 2016). Rural residents 
also tend to have more conservative family structures (Married-Couple) 
and tend to be more religious (Albrecht and Albrecht 1996; Struthers and 
Bokemeier 2000). Since Republicans have taken the conservative stand 
on social issues such as abortion and same sex marriage, their support 
among rural voters has been enhanced (Frank 2004; Krugman 2007; 
McKee and Teigen 2009). It is thus expected that even when controlling 
for other factors, rural residents will be more likely to vote Republican than 
their urban counterparts. 
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Figure 1. Percent of Votes for Republican Presidential 
Candidate by Metro/Nonmetro Status, 1960 - 2016
Metro Nonmetro
4
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 34 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol34/iss1/3
 ECONOMIC STRUCTURE CHANGE 
The economic structure of the United States has undergone profound 
transition in recent decades. Specifically, there has been a decline in the 
number of jobs in the goods-producing industries, which include the 
natural resource industries (farming, logging, mining, etc.), manufacturing, 
and construction. This transition has been especially pronounced in rural 
areas where the economy has traditionally been more dependent on these 
industries. At one time, many working class jobs provided by the goods-
producing industries resulted in the historically unique opportunity for less-
skilled workers to achieve relatively high levels of affluence (Albrecht and 
Albrecht 2008; Bluestone and Harrison 2000). Declining employment in 
these industries has had especially severe negative economic 
consequences for members of the working class with lower levels of 
education. 
Examples of declines in the goods-producing industries include the 
number of hours required in farm labor being reduced by nearly 90 
percent since 1930, resulting in dramatic declines in agricultural 
employment. In the past century, the number of coal mining jobs declined 
from about 800,000 to about 80,000. Similar declines are apparent in 
other mining and logging jobs. The number of jobs in manufacturing has 
declined by nearly 7 million since the 1970s (Albrecht 2014; Low 2017; 
Rasker 2017). Some manufacturing firms moved to foreign locations to 
take advantage of lower wages and weaker environmental standards in 
those countries. By far the most significant factor in these declines, 
however, was the development of machines that replaced human labor in 
the production process (Albrecht 2014; Hicks and Deveraj 2015; Powell 
and Snellman 2004). Using modern machines, production has greatly 
increased in all of the goods-producing industries despite a much smaller 
workforce.  
At the national level, fewer jobs in the goods-producing sector was 
offset by increased employment in the service sector. In rural areas, the 
proportional increase in service jobs has been lower and service jobs in 
rural areas tend to pay less than the goods-producing jobs they replace. 
There are numerous high-quality service jobs in sectors such as health 
care, education, and finance. These jobs, however, tend to require an 
advanced education. Such jobs are also less prominent in rural areas 
(Albrecht and Albrecht 2008). Service jobs for persons without advanced 
training tend to pay lower wages than jobs in the goods-producing 
industries for workers with similar education and training. Consequently, 
nonmetro America has relatively fewer jobs and a decline in average pay 
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 levels. As a result of these trends, rural areas have not recovered as 
quickly or as completely as urban areas from the Great Recession of 
2007-2009 (Farrigan 2015).  
The implications of these economic structure changes are 
significant. In constant dollars, incomes of the median male worker 
reached a peak in 1973 and have declined ever since. Wages of the 
average working class employee have declined by 25 percent since the 
1970s (Albrecht 2013; DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2012; Levinson 
2016). The gap between the wages of persons with a college degree and 
those without a college degree has increased steadily since the 1970s as 
a result of the changing economic structure (McCall 2000; 2001). The vast 
majority of economic growth in recent decades has gone to the elite, 
especially to the top 1 percent (Stiglitz 2012). Areas with the most 
extensive economic declines have experienced increased health problems 
and reduced life expectancy (Case and Deaton 2015; Monnat 2016).  
Areas most impacted by these changes voted heavily for Trump in 
2016 (Bor 2017; Goetz et al. 2018). The sources of these economic 
changes are major global transitions. The result, however, is that many 
workers feel anger and frustration because the skills and work ethic that 
once provided a livable wage are no longer relevant (Cramer 2016; 
Goldstein 2017; Vance 2016).  
Historically, Democrats received the majority of votes from workers 
in the goods-producing industries, largely as a consequence of their 
support for labor unions. In recent decades, the strength of labor unions 
has diminished considerably, reducing the Democrat base (Piazza 2001). 
Many working class people then became Republicans as a result of the 
Republican stand on social and cultural issues (Levendusky 2009).  
The message of Donald Trump was highly appealing to many 
American voters working in the goods-producing sector. His slogan “Make 
America Great Again” produced visions of a return to the day when 
working class jobs were abundant and paid a living wage. Trump 
promised to bring back these jobs by taking a tough stand on immigration, 
restructuring international trade agreements, and implementing tariffs 
intended to protect the American working class jobs. He promised to 
reduce environmental regulations that he argued are harmful to the goods-
producing sector. Of course this message also appealed to urban 
residents employed in the goods-producing sector. It is thus hypothesized 
that as dependence on employment in the goods-producing sector in a 
county increases, the proportion of persons in that county voting for 
Republicans will also increase. It is also expected that this relationship will 
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 be especially strong in the 2016 election relative to 2012 due to the unique 
message of Trump. 
 
EDUCATION AND INCOME 
Closely related to economic structure changes are the impacts these 
trends have on persons with different levels of educational attainment. 
Opposition to Roosevelt’s New Deal generally came from advantaged 
persons with higher levels of education and income. Consequently, 
counties with higher proportions of well-educated and high-income 
persons tended to vote Republican. Recent changes have completely 
altered this relationship and there is now a strong relationship between 
being highly educated and the likelihood of voting Democrat (Pew 
Research Center 2016). The relationship between higher incomes and 
voting Democrat exists, but is generally not as strong as the relationship 
with education. Many high-income persons support the tax benefits for the 
wealthy advocated by Republicans (Pew Research Center 2016).  
In recent years, highly educated persons are more likely to support 
the environmental platform of Democrats, which includes support for 
climate change (Dunlap, Van Liere, and Mertig 2000), and also the 
inclusive multicultural society emphasized by Democrats (Herring 2009). 
Republican support generally comes from persons who are threatened by 
these ideals and the changes they represent (Hochschild 2016). These 
persons fear that stronger environmental regulations will eliminate jobs 
and that minorities are given undeserved benefits that provide them 
advantages in the job market. It is thus hypothesized that as income and 
education levels in a county increase, the proportion of the residents 
voting Republican will decline. The strength of this relationship is expected 
to be stronger during the 2016 election than during the 2012 election. 
 
RACE/ETHNICITY 
Prior to the 1960s, race was not a significant factor in national elections, 
primarily because minority votes had largely been eliminated through a 
range of discriminatory policies (Kousser 1974). Franklin Roosevelt’s 
support base did not include minority voters. Roosevelt was, in fact, 
dependent on support from white southern Democrats for his New Deal 
policies and thus did not pursue a Civil Rights agenda (Sears 1976). 
During the 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement became a major part 
of the platform of Democrat presidents Kennedy and Johnson. During this 
era, major legislation was passed including the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Other policies were passed designed to 
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 improve opportunities for and the economic standing of minority 
populations. Johnson declared a “War on Poverty” and programs enacted 
to combat poverty were especially beneficial to minority populations as a 
larger proportion of them were in poverty.  
Since that time, Democrat platforms continue to emphasize policies 
supported by minorities such as affirmative action, fair housing, school 
integration, higher minimum wages, and the elimination of discrimination 
in the work force. Democrat programs typically have their basis in the 
federal government instead of state governments. Minorities tend to have 
less confidence that state governments will protect their rights (Hutchings 
and Valentino 2004). Since the 1960s, Democrats’ hold on the minority 
vote has been strong. In the 2012 election, for example, President Obama 
received 93 percent of the African-American vote, 71 percent of the 
Hispanic vote, and 73 percent of the Asian vote, but only 39 percent of the 
White vote. 
With enactment of Civil Rights legislation, Republicans recognized 
an opportunity to pull away some white voters who had previously tended 
to vote Democrat (Dionne 2016). Beginning with the Nixon campaign of 
1968, Republicans implemented a “Southern strategy” that made an 
appeal to racial conservatism (Aistrup 1996; Aldrich 2000; Black et al. 
2009; Phillips 2015). Direct racism was no longer socially acceptable, so 
Republicans pursued a policy that Tesler and Sears (2010) defined as 
“symbolic racism.” Symbolic racism maintains that minorities no longer 
face discrimination and minority disadvantages are due to their poor work 
ethic. In addition, it is argued that government aid programs will result in 
entitlement that will only reinforce this poor work ethic (Murray 1984). At 
the same time, poor whites are told by Republicans that their 
circumstances are made worse because so many resources are diverted 
to programs that benefit undeserving minorities. Especially troubling to 
many white voters are programs that give minority persons advantages in 
college admission and employment (McKee 2008). 
To a large extent, Republican plans have worked, and the 
Republican Party now has strong support from white working class voters 
(Scala and Johnson 2017). In 1960 and 1964, Democrat candidates 
(Kennedy and Johnson) received 55 percent of the vote from whites 
without a college degree. In 1968 and 1972, this number declined to 35 
percent, and disadvantaged whites have tended to vote Republican ever 
since (Teixeira 2009). Evidence indicates that racial attitudes polarized 
during the Obama administration and resulted in segments of the white 
population becoming more overtly racist (Tesler 2016). Trump’s message 
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 reached an even more responsive audience because minority populations 
were growing rapidly (Castles, de Haas, and Miller 2014). In 1980, 80 
percent of the US population was white; by the 2016 election, this 
proportion was just over 60 percent. Several states are now majority 
minority, and minority populations are growing in areas where minorities 
were previously very rare. It is now expected that the US will become a 
majority minority country by about 2040 (Colby and Ortman 2015). 
The white vote was vital to Trump’s victory in 2016, especially in 
critical swing states such as Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The 
Deep South has become solidly Republican (Monnat and Brown 2017). 
Strong Republican support is apparent in predominantly white rural areas 
throughout the country (McKee 2008). Trump ran a campaign with clear 
racial undertones and studies show that this helped him receive a higher 
proportion of the white vote compared to previous elections (Sides et al. 
2017). At the same time, it seems that rural counties with large minority 
populations tend to vote Democratic. It is thus hypothesized that as the 
proportion of the residents in a county that are white increase, the 
proportion voting Republican will also increase, and this tendency will be 
greater during the 2016 presidential election compared to the 2012 
election. 
 
METHODS 
The county is the unit of analysis for this study. Counties are relatively 
small geographic units for which data is available on voting behaviors as 
well as the independent variables utilized in this study. Concerns with 
using county data are recognized, but county data are the best choice. 
The percentage of votes for the Republican candidate is the dependent 
variable in this study. Only votes for Republican and Democrat candidates 
are considered. Votes for third party and other candidates are eliminated 
as their impact on the 2012 and 2016 elections were minimal. Voting data 
was obtained from David Leip’s Election Atlas (Leip 2016). 
The primary independent variable is the rural/urban continuum 
developed by the Economic Research Service (ERS) of USDA. 
Continuum scores range from 1 to 9. As the score increases, counties 
become progressively more rural and isolated. Categories 1-3 are 
metropolitan, while categories 4 through 9 are nonmetropolitan. The most 
metropolitan counties in Category 1 are the 432 counties in metro areas 
that have a population of 1 million or more. A majority of the US population 
lives in Category 1 counties alone. At the opposite extreme, Category 9 
counties are the 423 counties that are completely rural, with the largest 
9
Albrecht: The Nonmetro Vote and the Election of Donald Trump
Published by eGrove, 2019
 community having a population of less than 2,500, and that are not 
adjacent to a metro area (see Table 1).  
Other independent variables are obtained from the 2011-2015 
American Community Survey. Employment in the goods-producing 
industries is measured by the proportion of the employed labor force in the 
county working in agriculture, logging, mining, construction, and 
manufacturing. The proportion of the population in a county that is non-
Hispanic white is used to measure race/ethnicity. Educational attainment 
is measured by the proportion of people age 25 and older in the county 
with at least a college degree. Median household income in the county is 
used as the income measure. 
 
Table 1. Overview of U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research 
Service Rural-Urban Continuum Categories 
Category and Definition # of Counties 
Total 
Population 
Average 
Population 
Per County 
1. Metro-Counties in metro areas of 1 million 432 174,229,920 403,310 
2. Metro-Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 
1 million population. 378 67,262,832 177,944 
3. Metro-Counties in metro areas of fewer than 
250,000 population. 356 28,806,808 80,918 
4. Nonmetro-Urban population of 20,000 or 
more, adjacent to a metro area. 214 13,555,616 63,344 
5. Nonmetro-Urban population of 20,000 or 
more, not adjacent to metro area. 92 5,013,724 54,497 
6. Nonmetro-Urban population of 2,500 to 
19,999, not adjacent to a metro area. 592 14,689,296 24,813 
7. Nonmetro-Urban population of 2,500 to 
19,999, not adjacent to a metro area. 433 8,218,773 18,981 
8. Nonmetro-Completely rural or less than 2,500 
urban population, adjacent to metro area. 220 2,134,000 9,700 
9. Nonmetro-Completely rural or less than 2,500 
urban population, not adjacent to metro area. 423 2,582,415 6,105 
 
The analysis consists of categorical comparisons to explore the 
relationship between the rural/urban continuum, the other independent 
variables, and voting behavior. This is followed by a set of OLS regression 
models for both the entire nation and for the states of Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In these regression models, percentage of 
votes for the Republican candidate is the dependent variable, while the 
independent variables are the rural/urban continuum, percentage 
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 employed in the goods-producing industries, percentage white, education, 
and income. In the regression models, the rural/urban continuum is used 
as an interval variable when it is clearly an ordinal variable. The other 
independent variables are near normally distributed. 
 
FINDINGS 
The data in Table 2 provide strong support for the hypothesis that 
residence in rural communities is related to the likelihood of voting 
Republican. It is also clear that this tendency was greater in 2016 than in 
2012. Trump received 40.9 percent of the votes in the most urban 
counties (Category 1). This was slightly lower than the proportion received 
by Romney in these counties four years earlier. As counties become more 
rural, the proportion of votes for Trump generally increased. In Category 9, 
the most rural counties, Trump received 73.7 percent of the votes. This is 
a substantial increase from the 65.4 percent that Romney received in 
these counties in 2012.  
In the metro counties combined (categories 1-3), Trump received a 
slightly smaller proportion of the votes than Romney had received four 
years earlier (45.8 to 46.0 percent). Trump, however, received a 
substantially larger proportion of the nonmetro vote than Romney in 2012. 
Trump received 66.6 percent of the nonmetro vote, compared to 
Romney’s 59.4 percent of the vote in these counties in 2012. Clinton 
received over 2 million more votes in Category 1 counties than Obama 
received in those counties four years earlier. She received nearly 13 
million more votes than Trump in these most urban counties. However, 
she lost the other eight categories to Trump and received fewer votes than 
Obama had received in all eight of these categories. Even though Clinton 
won the popular vote by nearly three million votes, her failure to gain a 
higher proportion of the votes in rural counties, especially in key swing 
states, was clearly a primary factor in her loss (see Table 2). 
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 Table 2. Rural-Urban Continuum and Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016  
Rural-Urban Code Classification 
 
2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Romney 
  
Total Votes 29,194,595 13,465,219 6,646,215 3,159,676 1,102,736 3,752,860 2,125,064 594,002 766,355 60,806,722 
% of Votes 42.5 50.5 55.7 56.4 56.9 60.7 61.5 59.6 65.4 47.8 
Counties Won 267 256 269 160 68 495 356 183 368 2,422 
Obama 
          
Total Votes 39,439,630 13,193,364 5,287,656 2,446,998 834,803 2,426,740 1,327,925 402,616 405,952 65,765,684 
% of Votes 57.5 49.5 44.3 43.6 43.1 39.3 38.5 40.4 34.6 52.2 
Counties Won 205 139 100 57 24 102 78 37 57 799 
Difference -10,245,035 271,855 1,358,559 712,678 267,933 1,326,120 797,139 191,386 360,403 -4,958,962 
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 Table 2 (cont’d). Rural-Urban Continuum and Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016  
Rural-Urban Code Classification 
 
2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Trump 
  
Total Votes 28,867,018 14,211,274 7,024,836 3,490,278 1,181,178 4,209,203 2,323,709 672,847 846,188 62,826,531 
Change from 
2012 
-327,577 746,055 378,621 330,602 78,442 456,343 198,645 78,845 79,833 2,019,809 
% of Votes 40.9 52.4 59.9 63.1 61.9 68.7 68.2 67.5 73.7 48.9 
Change from 
2012 
-1.6 1.9 4.2 6.8 5 8 6.7 7.9 8.3 1.1 
Counties Won 275 282 301 184 73 540 383 196 387 2,621 
Change from 
2012 
8 26 32 24 5 45 27 13 19 199 
Clinton 
          
Total Votes 41,778,940 12,906,018 4,701,470 2,030,473 725,927 1,917,501 1,082,628 323,297 301,683 65,767,937 
Change from 
2012 
2,339,310 -287,346 -586,186 -416,525 -108,876 -509,239 -245,297 -79,319 -
104,269 
2,253 
% of Votes 59.1 47.6 40.1 36.8 38.1 31.3 31.8 32.5 26.3 51.1 
Change from 
2012 
1.6 1.9 -4.2 -6.8 -5 -8 6.7 -7.9 -8.3 -1.1 
Counties Won 197 113 68 33 19 57 51 24 38 600 
Change from 
2012 
-8 -26 -32 -24 -5 -45 -27 -13 -19 -199 
Difference -12,911,922 1,305,256 2,323,366 1,459,805 455,251 2,291,702 1,241,081 349,550 544,505 -2,941,406 
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 Table 3 presents data for the three vital swing states of Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Similar to national totals, Clinton easily won 
the Category 1 counties (57.2 percent to 42.8 percent). Trump then won 
the other eight categories of counties. Generally, as the county became 
more rural, Trump received a higher percentage of the vote. In Category 
9, the most rural counties, Trump received over 66 percent of the vote. In 
2012, Romney received 237,832 more votes than Obama in nonmetro 
counties (Categories 4-9) in the states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin combined. This was not enough to offset Obama’s margin in 
urban areas, and Romney lost all three states. Critically, in 2016, Trump 
received 661,303 more votes than Clinton in nonmetro counties in these 
three states. This margin was enough to offset Clinton’s victory in metro 
counties, and Trump was victorious in all three states. In the three states 
combined, Trump’s margin of victory was only 77,711 votes. If Clinton had 
received an average of only about 150 more votes in each of the rural 
counties in these three states, she would be president (see Table 3). 
 Table 4 presents data to show the extent to which support for 
Trump in 2016 changed compared to support for Mitt Romney in 2012. To 
achieve this goal, an examination of the relationship between voting 
behavior, the rural/urban continuum, and the other independent variables 
is provided. For three of the independent variables (percentage employed 
in the goods-producing industries, educational attainment, and median 
household income), counties are divided into quartiles and comparisons 
made in votes for Romney vs. Trump along the rural/urban continuum. For 
the remaining independent variable (race/ethnicity), majority white 
counties are compared with majority minority counties. These categorical 
comparisons will allow the nature of relationships to be more apparent. 
The data show a strong relationship between percentage employed 
in the goods-producing industries and an increase in the proportion of 
votes for Trump. In the highest quartile of counties, Trump received 10.8 
percent more votes than Romney received in 2012. As employment in 
these industries declined, the percentage of change in the number of 
votes for Trump also declined. For the counties with the lowest levels of 
employment in the goods-producing industries, the percentage of change 
in the number of votes for Trump increased by only 0.4 percent. It should 
be noted that counties with a lower proportion of workers employed in the 
goods-producing industries tend to be urban. 
  
14
Journal of Rural Social Sciences, Vol. 34 [2019], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jrss/vol34/iss1/3
 Table 3. Rural-Urban Continuum and Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin  
Rural-Urban Code Classification 
 
2012 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Romney 
          
Total Votes 2,540,896 1,553,665 893,655 458,126 57,870 369,811 207,077 36,179 76,412 6,193,691 
Percent of Votes 41.3 47 51.6 55.8 51.7 56.1 55.4 49.6 56.9 46.4 
Counties Won 16 17 17 20 3 32 28 4 17 154 
Obama           
Total Votes 3,605,983 1,753,504 838,080 363,056 54,121 289,300 166,526 36,761 57,879 7,165,210 
Percent of Votes 58.7 53 48.4 44.2 48.3 43.9 44.6 50.4 43.1 53.6 
Counties Won 10 17 12 4 1 8 6 7 3 68 
Difference -1,065,087 -199,839 -55,575 -95,070 -3,749 -80,511 -40,551 -582 18,533 -971,519 
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 Table 3 (cont’d). Rural-Urban Continuum and Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 in Michigan, 
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin  
Rural-Urban Code Classification 
 
2016 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Trump           
Total Votes 2,598,710 1,679,930 974,693 527,262 61,655 439,897 242,809 43,642 86,960 6,655,558 
Change from 2012 57,814 126,265 81,038 69,136 3,785 70,086 35,732 7,463 10,548 461,867 
Percent of Votes 42.8 50.3 57.9 64.9 55.5 67.5 65.9 62.1 66.2 50.3 
Change from 2012 1.5 3.3 6.3 9.1 3.8 11.4 10.5 12.5 9.3 3.9 
Counties Won 17 2.3 23 23 3 40 33 9 20 191 
Change from 2012 1 6 6 3 0 8 5 5 3 37  
          
Clinton           
Total Votes 3,466,604 1,657,517 709,804 285,609 49,461 212,036 125,781 26,660 44,375 6,577,847 
Change from 2012 -139,379 -95,987 -128,276 -77,447 -4,660 -77,264 40,745 -10,101 -13,504 -587,363 
Percent of Votes 57.2 49.7 42.1 35.1 44.5 32.5 34.1 37.9 33.8 49.7 
Change from 2012 -1.5 -3.3 -6.3 -9.1 3.8 -11.4 -10.5 -12.5 -9.3 -3.9 
Counties Won 9 11 6 1 1 0 1 2 0 31 
Change from 2012 -1 -6 -6 -3 0 -8 -5 -5 -3 -37 
Difference -867,894 22,413 264,889 241,653 12,194 227,861 117,028 16,982 42,585 77,711 
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  There was also clear support for the hypothesis about race/ethnicity 
and voting behavior. In majority white counties, Trump received 5.1 
percent more votes than Romney received in 2012, while in majority 
minority counties, Trump received 4.1 percent fewer votes than Romney 
received in 2012. 
 There was a clear relationship between educational attainment and 
change in the number of votes for Trump. In counties in the highest 
quartile of educational attainment, Trump received 1.1 percent fewer votes 
than Romney received four years earlier. In comparison, where 
educational attainment levels are lowest, Trump received 12.2 percent 
more votes than Romney had received. The results were similar for 
median household income. In the wealthiest counties, the number of votes 
for Trump declined relative to Romney, while in counties in the lowest 
quartile of median household income, there was a significant increase in 
the number of votes for Trump compared to Romney.  
To summarize, Table 4 clearly shows that, when compared to 
Romney, Trump was able to attract a much larger number of votes in 
counties with high proportions of workers in the goods-producing 
industries, where most residents are white and where educational levels 
and incomes are low (see Table 4). 
 Tables 5 and 6 show the results of regression analyses. The 
regression models for the entire nation is presented in Table 5, while the 
models for the three states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin are 
shown in Table 6. In all models, the percentage of votes for the 
Republican candidate is the dependent variable, while the rural/urban 
continuum, percentage employed in the goods-producing industries, 
race/ethnicity, educational attainment, and median household income are 
independent variables. Preliminary analysis also included the interaction 
variables between the rural-urban continuum and each of the other 
independent variables. The interaction variable for the rural-urban 
continuum and employment in the goods-producing industries was 
statistically significant and so is included in the models presented in 
Tables 5 and 6.  
Most significantly, the regression models explained a much higher 
proportion of variation in the dependent variable in 2016 than in 2012. This 
indicates that the already strong divisions in our country had become even 
more pronounced in 2016. Overall, the most important independent  
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 variable was educational attainment. As expected, in counties with a lower 
proportion of college graduates, the percentage of votes for Republican 
candidates increased. This relationship was much stronger in 2016 than in 
2012. Race/ethnicity was the next strongest variable, and as expected, as 
the percentage of residents who are white increased, the percentage of 
Republican votes increased.  
At the national level, the other three independent variables 
(rural/urban continuum, percentage employed in the goods-producing 
industries, and median household income) were statistically significant, 
but not as strong as education and race/ethnicity. In each case the 
relationships were in the expected direction. That is, counties most likely 
to vote Republican were more rural, had high proportions of persons 
employed in the goods-producing industries, and had low incomes. The 
negative relationship for the interaction variable indicates that the 
importance of employment in the goods-producing industries declines in 
the most rural counties. For the three state (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and 
Wisconsin) regression model, the rural/urban continuum variable was not 
statistically significant, indicating that it is not rural residence per se, but 
the characteristics of rural counties that result in their overwhelming 
support of Republican candidates, and especially for Trump (see Tables 5 
and 6).  
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 Table 4. Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 by Rural-Urban Continuum and Independent Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Rural-Urban Continuum Category 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
% in Goods Producing Industries 
Highest Quartile 
Romney 148,342 602,549 424,979 549,440 174,475 1,355,675 563,038 195,693 297,156 4,311,347 
Trump 
(% Change) 
165,199 
(11.4) 
647,903 
(7.5) 
458,869 
(8.0) 
613,680 
(11.7) 
186,683 
(7.0) 
1,543,062 
(13.8) 
612,847 
(8.8) 
222,308 
(10.0) 
327,019 
(10.0) 
4,777,570 
(10.8) 
Second Quartile 
Romney 1,337,925 1,775,916 1,387,886 894,394 178,445 1,060,480 585,596 168,501 239,093 7,628,236 
Trump 
(% Change) 
1,396,593 
(4.4) 
1,885,763 
(6.2) 
1,489,772 
(7.3) 
1,001,423 
(12.0) 
192,655 
(8.0) 
1,195,380 
(12.7) 
659,009 
(12.5) 
191,638 
(13.7) 
266,459 
(11.4) 
8,278,692 
(8.5) 
Third Quartile 
Romney 6,152,339 4,078,678 1,587,181 941,580 304,745 909,537 626,516 145,730 148,593 14,894,899 
Trump 
(% Change) 
6,235,148 
(1.3) 
4,291,825 
(5.2) 
1,724,503 
(8.7) 
1,056,522 
(12.2) 
334,036 
(9.6) 
1,008,551 
(10.9) 
689,483 
(10.1) 
163,662 
(12.3) 
165,933 
(11.7) 
15,669,663 
(5.2) 
Lowest Quartile 
Romney 21,555,989 7,008,076 3,246,169 774,262 445,071 427,168 349,914 84,078 81,513 33,972,240 
Trump 
(% Change) 
21,070,078 
(-2.3) 
7,385,783 
(5.4) 
3,351,692 
(3.3) 
818,653 
(5.7) 
467,804 
(5.1) 
462,210 
(8.2) 
362,370 
(3.6) 
95,239 
(13.3) 
86,777 
(6.5) 
34,100,606 
(0.4) 
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 Table 4 (cont’d). Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 by Rural-Urban Continuum and Independent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Rural-Urban Continuum Category 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Race/ Ethnicity 
Majority White 
Romney 20,090,721 11,624,625 6,230,393 2,961,960 1,013,645 3,526,065 2,023,854 559,398 741,090 48,771,751 
Trump 
(% Change) 
20,248,468 
(0.8) 
12,396,178 
(6.6) 
6,603,440 
(6.0) 
3,287,632 
(11.0) 
1,090,335 
(7.6) 
3,975,156 
(12.7) 
2,222,153 
(9.8) 
637,063 
(13.9) 
820,062 
(10.7) 
51,280,487 
(5.1) 
Majority Minority 
Romney 9,103,874 1,840,594 415,822 197,716 89,091 226,795 101,210 34,604 25,265 12,034,971 
Trump 
(% Change) 
8,618,550 
(-5.3) 
1,815,096 
(-1.4) 
421,396 
(1.3) 
202,646 
(2.5) 
90,843 
(2.0) 
234,047 
(3.2) 
101,556 
(0.3) 
35,784 
(3.4) 
26,126 
(3.4) 
11,546,044 
(-4.1) 
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 Table 4 (cont’d). Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 by Rural-Urban Continuum and Independent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Rural-Urban Continuum Category 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Educational Attainment 
Highest Quartile 
Romney 25,138,413 8,787,287 2,900,484 722,556 349,921 304,513 343,262 50,331 90,715 38,687,482 
Trump 
(% Change) 
24,304,818 
(-3.3) 
9,041,377 
(2.9) 
2,967,218 
(2.3) 
745,131 
(3.1) 
367,565 
(5.0) 
323,183 
(6.1) 
355,865 
(3.7) 
54,171 
(7.6) 
92,093 
(1.5) 
38,251,421 
(-1.1) 
Second Quartile 
Romney 2,902,811 3,154,201 2,496,345 941,331 414,199 618,108 480,507 115,498 291,176 11,342,176 
Trump 
(% Change) 
3,216,702 
(10.8) 
3,469,323 
(10.0) 
2,671,831 
(7.0) 
1,046,293 
(11.2) 
451,616 
(9.0) 
690,008 
(11.6) 
527,268 
(9.7) 
127,541 
(10.4) 
239,028 
(9.1) 
12,439,610 
(9.7) 
Third Quartile 
Romney 893,302 1,031,420 855,046 1,101,072 267,207 1,226,652 725,203 162,001 166,847 6,428,750 
Trump 
(% Change) 
1,044,045 
(16.9) 
1,163,568 
(12.8) 
944,681 
(10.5) 
1,247,270 
(13.3) 
286,129 
(7.1) 
1,398,237 
(14.0) 
800,597 
(10.4) 
184,635 
(14.0) 
186,012 
(11.5) 
7,255,174 
(12.9) 
Lowest Quartile 
Romney 260,069 492,311 394,340 394,717 71,409 1,603,587 576,092 266,172 289,617 4,348,314 
Trump 
(% Change) 
301,453 
(15.9) 
537,006 
(9.1) 
441,106 
(11.9) 
451,584 
(14.4) 
75,868 
(6.2) 
1,797,775 
(12.1) 
639,979 
(11.1) 
306,500 
(15.2) 
329,055 
(13.6) 
4,880,326 
(12.2) 
 
  
21
Albrecht: The Nonmetro Vote and the Election of Donald Trump
Published by eGrove, 2019
 Table 4 (cont’d). Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 by Rural-Urban Continuum and Independent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Rural-Urban Continuum Category 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Median Household Income 
Highest Quartile 
Romney 22,674,738 5,914,998 1,776,926 552,418 239,236 328,016 274,421 69,853 110,473 31,941,079 
Trump 
(% Change) 
2,083,010 
(-2.6) 
6,151,700 
(4.0) 
1,830,432 
(3.0) 
578,944 
(4.8) 
252,818 
(5.7) 
369,285 
(12.6) 
280,348 
(2.2) 
78,860 
(12.9) 
118,378 
(7.2) 
31,743,775 
(-0.6) 
Second Quartile 
Romney 4,580,937 4,618,910 2,457,053 922,117 242,241 996,870 503,704 109,642 166,430 14,597,904 
Trump 
(% Change) 
4,743,259 
(3.5) 
4,846,482 
(4.9) 
2,584,523 
(5.2) 
1,038,944 
(12.7) 
261,805 
(8.1) 
1,129,660 
(13.3) 
553,498 
(9.9) 
123,787 
(12.9) 
182,039 
(9.4) 
15,463,997 
(5.9) 
Third Quartile 
Romney 1,691,548 2,455,473 1,908,671 1,150,169 412,445 1,218,372 598,203 156,336 169,477 9,760,694 
Trump 
(% Change) 
1,771,379 
(4.7) 
2,700,887 
(10.0) 
2,066,732 
(8.3) 
1,296,866 
(12.8) 
444,708 
(7.8) 
1,380,350 
(13.3) 
665,306 
(11.2) 
181,342 
(16.0) 
188,870 
(11.4) 
10,696,440 
(9.6) 
Lowest Quartile 
Romney 247,372 475,838 503,565 534,972 208,814 1,209,602 748,736 258,171 319,975 4,507,045 
Trump 
(% Change) 
269,370 
(8.9) 
512,205 
(7.6) 
543,149 
(7.9) 
575,524 
(7.6) 
221,847 
(6.2) 
1,329,908 
(9.9) 
824,557 
(10.1) 
288,858 
(11.9) 
356,901 
(11.5) 
4,922,319 
(9.2) 
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 Table 4 (cont’d). Votes in Presidential Elections of 2012 and 2016 by Rural-Urban Continuum and Independent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Rural-Urban Continuum Category 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
Total 
Romney 29,194,595 13,465,219 6,646,215 3,159,676 1,102,736 3,752,860 2,125,064 594,002 766,355 60,806,722 
Trump 
(% Change) 
28,867,018 
(-1.1) 
14,211,274 
(5.5) 
7,024,836 
(5.7) 
3,490,278 
(10.5) 
1,181,178 
(7.1) 
4,209,203 
(12.2) 
2,323,709 
(9.3) 
672,847 
(13.3) 
846,188 
(10.4) 
62,826,531 
(3.3) 
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 Table 5. Regression Analysis Showing the Relationship Between Independent Variables and Percent Voting 
Republican 2012-2016 (N=3,110) 
Independent Variables 
2012 2016 
Parameter 
Estimate 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Parameter 
Estimate 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Rural-Urban Continuum .008* .006, .010 .152 .009* .007, .010 .151 
Percent in Goods Producing Industries .099* .094, .102 .109 .095* .092, .099 .100 
Percent White .270* .247, .294 .360 .371* .350, .391 .463 
Educational Attainment -.633* -.701, -.566 -.387 -.951* -1.010, -0.890 -.546 
Median Household Income .0027* .002, .003 .221 .0024* .002, .003 .188 
Rural-Urban/Goods Producing Interaction -.0014* -.002, -.001 -.177 -.001* -.002, -.001 -.161 
Intercept  .363* .366, .391 - .396* .372, .420 - 
F-Value 226.54* - - 585.55* - - 
Model R2 .305 - - .531 - - 
* Statistically significant at the .05 level 		 	
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Table 6. Regression Analysis Showing the Relationship Between Independent Variables and Percent Voting 
Republican, in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, 2012-2016 (N=222) 
Independent Variables 
2012 2016 
Parameter 
Estimate 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Parameter 
Estimate 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
Standardized 
Beta 
Rural-Urban Continuum .003 -.003, .009 .081 .004 -.001, .009 .089 
Percent in Goods Producing Industries .133 .006, .148 .026 .150 .136, .163 .072 
Percent White .457* .338, .576 .489 .510* .407, .613 .481 
Educational Attainment -.416* -.612, -.219 -.340 -.848* -1.018, -.689 -.613 
Median Household Income .0032* .001, .005 .301 .0027* .001, .004 .222 
Rural-Urban/Goods Producing Interaction .0010 .001, .001 .022 -.0012 -.002, .001 -.047 
Intercept  .033 -.093, .158 - .165* .057, .273 - 
F-Value 22.09* - - 64.36* - - 
Model R2 .381 - - .642 - - 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level 
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 CONCLUSIONS 
Winning an overwhelming majority of rural votes was vital in Donald 
Trump’s triumph in the 2016 presidential election. In the critical swing 
states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, Trump not only received 
a much higher proportion of the rural vote than his opponent, Hillary 
Clinton, but also received many more rural votes than Mitt Romney had 
received four years earlier. The increased rural vote was enough to assure 
his victory. 
 Regression analysis revealed that the most important independent 
variables in explaining voting behavior were educational attainment and 
race/ethnicity. As expected, the data revealed that counties with low levels 
of educational attainment and a high percentage of white residents had 
large proportions of their residents vote for Trump. The variables of 
median household income, percentage employed in the goods-producing 
industries, and the rural/urban continuum were statistically significant but 
not as strong. The weakness of the rural/urban continuum variable 
indicates that it is not rural residence per se, but the fact that rural 
counties tend to have lower levels of educational attainment, lower 
incomes, a higher percentage of white residents, and higher rates of 
employment in the goods-producing industries that result in their support 
for Trump.  
It should also be mentioned that Clinton won a number of rural 
counties. Rural counties won by Clinton tended to be of two types. The 
first are predominantly minority counties, including counties in the South 
with large African-American populations and counties in the West with 
large Latino or Native American populations. The second group of 
counties won by Clinton is high amenity counties with high proportions of  
well-educated and wealthy residents, such as Teton County (Jackson), 
Wyoming and Pitkin County (Aspen), Colorado. 
This analysis made apparent the extent to which there appears to 
be two Americas with a large and growing gap between them. On the one 
side are communities that are urban and diverse, where residents tend to 
be highly educated, have relatively high incomes, and are less dependent 
on employment in the goods-producing industries. These counties are well 
integrated into the modern economy. Hillary Clinton, and President 
Obama before her, received a large majority of the votes in these 
counties.  
On the other side are rural counties and parts of urban areas where 
most residents are white, tend to be employed in the goods-producing 
industries, and have lower levels of educational attainment and lower 
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 incomes. This includes counties in Appalachia dependent on the coal 
industry, Rust Belt counties where manufacturing employment is in 
decline, and counties in the Midwest and West that have been traditionally 
dependent on agriculture, logging, or mining. Individuals in these counties 
are experiencing severe economic distress, and as a consequence, 
tended to vote for Trump. These results support the framework that 
individuals who feel that their social standing is being eroded by change 
are likely to oppose that change. In their mind, a clear way of resisting 
change was to vote for Donald Trump who in effect vowed to make 
America great by making it like it used to be.  
In many ways the Republican Party as defined by Donald Trump is 
not sustainable. His plans to restore working class jobs cannot succeed 
long-term because it does not address the primary reason for the decline 
in these jobs, which is technological change. Demographically, the 
proportion of the total population that is white will continue to decline. The 
continued relevance of the Republican Party depends on finding a way to 
attract non-white voters and voters with higher levels of education. At the 
same time, the opportunity exists for the Democratic Party to once again 
become relevant in the predominantly white communities of rural America. 
White rural America feels like Democrats have abandoned them. What 
Democrats need to do is develop and implement policies that benefit rural 
Americans, including policies that help these communities become a vital 
part of twenty-first century America.  
The working class needs help, but this help must be of the type that 
effectively addresses the problem. The working class jobs in the goods-
producing industries are not coming back in large numbers. Instead, 
continued technological changes will make an even greater segment of 
American jobs obsolete. We cannot address the problem by turning the 
clock back. Both parties could benefit from providing policies and 
programs that actually benefit persons currently experiencing economic 
distress. Most significant would be people-based programs that help 
individuals obtain the education and training necessary to succeed in a 
modern twenty-first century economy. 
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